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Abstract Opposing theories and conflicting empirical results with regard to the
effect of development time on new product sales suggest the need for a contingency
analysis into factors affecting this relationship. This study uses a unique combination
of accounting and perceptual data from 129 product development projects to test the
combined contingency effect of product innovativeness and new product price on the
relationship between development time and new product sales. The results show that
for radically new products with short development times, price has no effect on new
product sales. When the development time is long, price has a negative effect on the
sales of radical new products. The findings additionally show that price has no effect
on sales for incremental new products with short development times and a negative
effect for incremental new products with long development times. Together, these
findings shed new light on the relationship between development time and new
product sales.
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Many studies posit that shortening the new product’s development time brings about
an increased level of cohesion among team members which results in fewer mistakes
that might cause problems after product launch (see, e.g., Chen et al. 2005). Faster
development has also been linked with improved coordination and subsequent
reductions in costly work redundancy, errors, and recycling that will cause quality
problems after adoption (Harter et al. 2000). Concentration on speed also forces a
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development team to focus on those elements of a product design that are most
relevant for customers (Ali et al. 1995). For these reasons, many studies posit that
development time reduction may improve the new product’s acceptance by potential
users (Kessler and Chakrabarti 1996).
However, there is also recognition that development time reduction may have
disadvantages. Attempts to reduce development time may sacrifice necessary market
research steps that lead to reduced feature sets or lower performance-price ratios.
Besides, an overly tight schedule might push the new product development (NPD)
project past the limits of organizational capabilities and result in under-designed
products (Vincent 1989). Design errors can also arise from skipping process steps,
and having members of speeded up teams chew up the firm’s support resources
(Langerak et al. 2008). For these reasons speeding up development time may result
in compromised product advantage and extensive post-launch product debugging
that slow customer acceptance (Crawford 1992).
The contrast between theories advocating the (dis)advantages of shortening
development time is also reflected in conflicting empirical results with regard to the
effect on new product sales. Several studies show positive results (e.g., Calantone
and Di Benedetto 2000; Lynn et al. 1999), some mixed findings (e.g., Ittner and
Larcker 1997), and others present no evidence of a relationship (e.g., Dröge et al.
2004; Griffin 2002). Reflecting on these divergent empirical results it seems likely
that under some circumstances, development time reduction has a positive effect on
new product sales and under other conditions a negative effect.
A contingency analysis may provide new insights into the complex relationship
between development time and new product sales (Chen et al. 2005). Prior research
has identified product innovativeness as an important contingency factor (e.g., Ali
2000; Langerak and Hultink 2006). These studies show that shortening the
development time of radical new products lowers sales revenues. Conversely, they
show that shortening the cycle time of incremental new products improves the
chance of meeting revenue goals. The rationale for these findings is that radical new
projects are typically more difficult, risky, and costly to accelerate than incremental
projects (Griffin 1997). As such, radical new projects that are accelerated mostly
induce the disadvantages associated with cycle time reduction, while shortening the
cycle time of incremental projects typically brings on the advantages.
This study extends these analyses by focusing on the combined contingency
effect of product innovativeness and new product price. This is important because
the marketing literature is clear about the need to coordinate the development time
and product innovativeness decisions with other launch decisions, in particular the
new product’s price (e.g., Hultink and Robben 1999; Ingenbleek et al. 2004). A
penetration price may, for example, be appropriate to reinforce the advantages that
accelerated development of incremental new products brings on (Crawford and Di
Benedetto 2006). Despite the clear need to coordinate the pricing decision with the
product’s innovativeness and development time, prior research has mostly studied
this decision in isolation. Therefore, our objective is to investigate how new product
price influences the sales of radical versus incremental new products with either
short or long development times.
To accomplish our aim, we review the marketing and NPD literatures to develop
two hypotheses on how product innovativeness and new product price together
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influence the relationship between development time and new product sales. The
hypotheses are tested using a unique dataset from 129 completed NPD projects with
continued market acceptance from a single firm. The existing development time
literature has mostly used survey data across multiple firms and often focused on a
single new product per firm. These studies can therefore suffer from problems due to
selection and response bias, difficulties in comparing results across firms and
industries, and isolating the firm effect from the effect of the new product studied.
By using data across many new products in a single firm, this study gets around
most of these problems.
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. The next section presents the
definitions and hypotheses. The research methodology and model are then presented,
followed by the results and their implications. The final section discusses limitations
and directions for further research.
1 Hypotheses
To be consistent with prior research, we define development time as the elapsed time
from the beginning of idea generation, when the firm decided to develop a new
product, to market introduction (e.g., Griffin 2002; Kessler and Chakrabarti 1999).
To assess product innovativeness, we distinguish between radical versus incremental
products. A radical new product is one that incorporates a substantially different
technology and requires different marketing skills compared to existing products in
the industry (Chandy et al. 2003). An incremental innovation is designed to satisfy a
felt market need and uses an existing technology or refinement of it (Min et al.
2006).
Prior research shows that development time reduction worsens a radical new
product’s acceptance by potential users (e.g., Ali 2000). The rationale is that
accelerated development of radical new products usually brings on the disadvantages
of development time reduction because radical projects are difficult to plan, risky to
execute, and complex to implement (Griffin 1997). These disadvantages negatively
affect the benefits that the new product provides to customers. Product advantage
may be harmed when skipping development steps sacrifices engineering and market
research information that is necessary to get the new product design right (Langerak
et al. 2008). An overly tight lead time schedule also raises the probability that design
mistakes are made because it pushes the NPD project past the limits of R&D and
marketing capabilities (Agarwal and Bayus 2002). Time budget cuts can also
constrain the amount of product advantage achieved and slow down customer
acceptance (Calantone and Di Benedetto 2000). Radical products also call for a
special sales force, distribution field capacity, or a stand-by plan if problems come
up after launch. These requirements may, however, also be warped under pressure of
accelerated NPD (Calantone and Di Benedetto 2000). As a result, the radical new
product’s ability to meet customer needs may be compromised, and customers are
likely to adopt a wait-and-see strategy. The launch literature suggests that to
surmount these adoption barriers and increase diffusion firms may set a lower price
at the moment of launch (Guiltinan 1999). Such a price discount rewards customers
for adopting an underdeveloped new product (Crawford and Di Benedetto 2006).
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However, the sales gain of a reduced price is likely to be small in comparison to the
sales loss brought on by the compromised advantage of a radical new product that is
rushed to market.
In contrast, firms taking more time to develop radical new products are usually
able to repress most of the disadvantages associated with cycle time reduction that
impair new product benefits (Crawford 1992). These firms avoid the possible
problems of an underdeveloped product advantage and extensive post-launch
product debugging. Moreover, firms that take more time can better understand the
preferences of customers, identify a superior but overlooked product position, and
set up a sufficient distribution capacity and sales force. Taking more time also allows
firms to better inform customers about their radical new product’s advantage. The
literature suggests that firms may charge a premium price if the radical new
product’s advantage supports a higher price (Hultink and Robben 1999). However,
charging a premium price is often too costly to firms with longer development times
because of the new product’s extended break even time (Ali et al. 1995). Firms with
lengthier development times have usually incurred higher development costs and by
charging a premium price demand is unnecessarily restricted to those customers
willing and able to pay a high price. In contrast, charging a low price for a radical
new product with a high advantage stimulates demand and expands the potential
market beyond high-end customers (Guiltinan 1999). The sales benefits of a reduced
price are expected to be significant for radical new products with an uncompromised
product advantage (Calantone and Di Benedetto 2000). Moreover, setting a
penetration price for products that are kept in development longer helps to drive
the volume-related cost decreases that are important for highly advantaged radical
new products to become successful.
Based on the above line of reasoning that for radical new products development
time reduction results in compromised product advantage, we expect that the sales
benefits of a price discount for radical new products with short development times,
while potentially significant, is smaller than the sales increase that a reduced price
brings about for radical new products with long cycle times. Therefore:
H1: The negative effect of price on sales is weaker for radical new products with
short development times than for radical new product with long development
times.
Prior research posits that development time reduction improves the incremental
new product’s acceptance by potential users (e.g., Langerak and Hultink 2006). The
reason is that accelerated development of incremental projects typically brings on the
advantages of development time reduction because they can easily be planned and
implemented (LaBahn et al. 1996). Faster incremental NPD has been linked with
fewer mistakes, improved coordination, and subsequent reductions in costly work
redundancy, errors, and recycling that will cause problems after market launch that
slow down customer acceptance (Harter et al. 2000). Incremental new products
typically refine and modify existing products, so customers can easily identify
incremental benefits relative to existing products (Gatignon and Xuereb 1997). The
fact that customer needs already exist makes potential users more price sensitive,
especially because they have more information at their disposal to evaluate the
incremental new product’s advantage than just price (Gatignon and Xuereb 1997).
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Moreover, an incremental new product’s advantage is likely to erode fast, which has
a tempering effect on the upper boundary of price discretion (Monroe 1990). The
narrow window of opportunity of incremental new products also favors setting a low
price in order to generate sufficient sales (Robertson 1993). In addition, incremental
products are often aimed at the largest and often most price-sensitive market
segment. A penetration price may increase the appeal of an incremental new product
to this segment and boosts new product sales (Ali et al. 1995). These arguments
suggest that price reinforces the negative effect that development time has on the
sales of incremental new products. Thus:
H2: Price has a negative effect on the sales of incremental new products,
regardless of the development time elapsed.
2 Research methodology
2.1 Research design
This study focuses on a single firm to eliminate important confounding cross-industry
and cross-firm factors as possible explanations for differences in new product sales
(Naveh 2007). We do not deny that other factors may be relevant for new product
sales. However, the focus of this study is on project-specific differences that cause
some new products to sell better than others. Studying one firm helps us to focus on
this objective and reduces concerns about internal validity. At the same time, the
projects show substantial heterogeneity because they cover seven product lines. Each
product line is supported by a different technology platform, and its products are
targeted at customers in different markets. While there is no doubt that the use of
multiple firms would enhance the external validity of the findings, we chose to
emphasize internal validity over generalizability, as our study is the first to investigate
the combined contingency effects of new product innovativeness and price.
2.2 Empirical context
The firm in this study was the plastics division of one of the largest and most
diversified industrial corporations in the world. This $6 billion plastic material
supplier and distributor serves customers in a variety of industries, including
aerospace, automotive, construction, data storage, optical media, medical, electron-
ics, telecommunications, computers, and packaging. The division employs about
10,000 people and operates some 60 manufacturing and technology facilities in 20
countries worldwide. The division launched more than 600 new products across the
seven product lines between 2004 and 2006.
2.3 Data
The population for the study was 129 of these new product introductions. To ensure
group size equivalence, the sample consisted of 64 incremental and 65 radical new
products. We used the firm’s database to obtain information on each new product’s
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development time, average selling price, unit sales volume, introduction date, and the
product line to which the new product belongs. Additional binary data on product
innovativeness (0=incremental; 1=radical) and two control variables with a recognized
influence on new product sales volume—namely, whether the new product was
initiated through market pull or technology push (0=push; 1=pull) and whether lead
users were involved in the NPD process (0=not involved; 1=involved)—were
compiled by asking two managers (i.e., the product line manager and the industry
manager) to independently code each new product. The proportion of interjudge
agreement was 94% for new product innovativeness, 98% for market pull, and 100%
for lead user involvement. Disagreements were resolved through discussion.
We also externally validated the managerial classification on product innovative-
ness by asking an industry expert to rate the innovativeness of a subsample of 87
new products. The expert considered himself knowledgeable on only 66 of these
new products. Subsequently, he was asked to rate the degree of innovativeness of
only these new products on a five-point scale. The expert had no knowledge about
the fact that the managers classified 38 of these 66 new products as incremental and
28 as radical. A t test revealed a significant (p<0.05) difference between the expert’s
mean rating of 1.18 for the 38 new products that the managers classified as
incremental and his average rating of 4.46 for the 28 new products that the managers
classified as radical. Table 1 provides an overview of all variables and their sources.
The new product’s launch date enabled us to compute the number of weeks that the
product had been on the market (on average 63.64 weeks with a SD of 50.43). The new
product’s sales volume encompassed the cumulative unit sales from the introduction
date to the start of the third quarter of 2006. To address any differential timing effects
Table 1 Conceptual variables and measures
Conceptual
variable
Measure Source
Development time Elapsed time in weeks from the beginning of idea generation, when
the firm decided to develop a new product, to market introduction
Firm database
New product price The new product’s average selling price in dollars between market
introduction and the start of the 3rd quarter of 2006
Firm database
Cumulative new
product sales
Cumulative new product sales in units from introduction date to
start of the 3rd quarter of 2006
Firm database
New product
launch date
The date on which the new product was introduced into the market Firm database
Product
innovativeness
The new product incorporates a different technology and requires
different marketing skills compared to existing products in the
industry (yes/no)
Managerial
classification
Lead user
involvement
Lead user involvement in the development process (yes/no) Managerial
classification
Pull or push New product development initiated primarily through market pull
or technology push?
Managerial
classification
Quarter dummies The quarter in which the new product was introduced in the market
ranging from the 1st quarter of 2004 to the start of the 3rd quarter
of 2006.
Computed
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for new products introduced in the early part of the study, relative to those introduced
later in the study period, we decided to compute quarter dummies, based on the new
product’s launch date, which were additionally used as control variables. In the
analyses, we left out the quarter dummy representing the first quarter making it the
reference quarter for the effects of the remaining nine quarter dummies. Eight (out of
ten) quarter dummies were not significantly related to product innovativeness and the
quarter dummy for the third quarter (r=−0.28, p<0.01) and the dummy for the fifth
quarter (r=0.26, p<0.01) both had significant but opposite relationships with
product innovativeness. These correlations also suggest that there is no systematic
relationship between time and product innovativeness. Table 2 provides an overview
of the correlations among the key variables and their means and SDs.
3 Model
3.1 Model specification
Equation (1) was used to test the significance of the moderating effects that we have
hypothesized. We propose that the effect of price on sales depends on the level of
product innovativeness and that development time acts as a moderator on this
interaction between product innovativeness and price. Hence, the equation includes a
three-way interaction term. In order to properly test this three-way interaction, the
three lower-order two-way interaction terms and the main effects should be included
in the model as well (Aiken and West 1996). The equation also includes control
variables and is represented as follows:
Si ¼ b0 þ b1
X
i
X j þ b12DTi þ b13PIi þ b14Pi þ b15 DTi  PI ið Þ
þ b16 DTi  Pið Þ þ b17 PIi  Pið Þ þ b18 DTi  PIi  Pið Þ þ "i ð1Þ
Where:
Xj control variables (quarter dummies, lead user involvement, and market pull)
S cumulative sales
Table 2 Means, SDs, and correlation for key constructs
Mean S.D. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.
1. Development time 63.64 50.43 –
2. Product innovativeness 0.49 0.50 −0.23** –
3. New product price 7.14 5.00 0.14 −0.02 –
4. Lead user involvement 0.48 0.50 0.05 −0.10 −0.04 –
5. Market pull 0.50 0.50 −0.07 0.21* 0.05 −0.61** –
6. Cumulative sales volume 242.55 484.75 0.12 0.04 −0.19* 0.22* −0.10
*p<0.05; **p<0.01
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DT development time
PI product innovativeness
P price.
For the testing of H1, we conducted a slope difference test (Dawson and
Richter 2006), and for testing H2, we conducted simple slope tests (Aiken and
West 1996). Equation (2) shows how the t value for the slope difference test was
computed.
t value for the slope difference test ¼ bradical; short þ bradical; longﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
s16 16 þ s18 18 þ 2s16 18
p ð2Þ
where:
bradical,short the simple slope for the effect of price on sales for radical new products
with short development times
bradical,long the simple slope for the effect of price on sales for radical new products
with long development times
s (co)variance, where, for example, s1616 is the variance of the parameter
estimate β16, and s1618 is the covariance between parameter estimates
β16 and β18.
Equation (3) shows how the four simple slopes for the effect of price on sales for
the different levels of product innovativeness and development time were computed.
Equation (4) shows how the SE of this slope was computed. The t value for a simple
slope test was computed by dividing the simple slope with the standard error.
Simple slope of price on sales ¼ b14 þ b16DTi þ b17PIj þ b18 DTi  PIj
  ð3Þ
Standard error for simple slope of price on sales
¼
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
s1;414 þ DT 2  s1;616 þ PI2  s1;717 þ DT 2  PI2  s1;818 þ 2 DT  s1;416
þ2 PI  s1;417 þ 2 DT  P  s1;418 þ 2 DT  PI  s1;617 þ 2 PI
DT 2  s1;618 þ 2 PI2  DT  s1;718
vuuuut
ð4Þ
where:
DT development time
i level of development time (−1=low (short development time), 1=high (long
development time))
PI product innovativeness
j level of product innovativeness (0=low (incremental products), 1=high
(radical products))
s (co)variance, where, for example, s1414 is the variance of the parameter
estimate β14, and s1416 is the covariance between parameter estimates β14
and β16.
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3.2 Model estimation
We used hierarchical moderated regression analysis to estimate the model. To
minimize concerns about product line differences affecting the estimation results, we
standardized the data by forcing the variables to have a mean of zero and a SD of 1
within each product line prior to analysis. Table 3 (model 1) shows that the control
variables explain 19% of the variance in new product sales. Adding the independent
variables in model 2 increased the R2 to 27% (ΔF=4.045, p<0.01). The interaction
terms, which were added in model 3, resulted in a further significant increase of the
R2 to 44% (ΔF=8.438, p<0.01). The F value in each model was significant at
p<0.01, which means that each regression model as a whole has statistically
significant predictive capability. The highest variance inflation factor across the three
models was 2.73, and the maximum condition index was 9.56, indicating that
multicollinearity was not a serious problem (Belsley et al. 1980; Hair et al. 1998).
4 Results
4.1 Hypothesis testing
The interaction between development time, product innovativeness, and new product
price is negatively related to new product sales (b18=−0.78, p<0.01). The slope
difference test (Dawson and Richter 2006) shows that for radical new products with
short development times, the effect of price is significantly weaker than for radical
new products with long development times (t value=−4.168, p<.01). Thus, H1 is
supported. Simple slope tests show that price has no significant effect on new
product sales for radical products with short development times (simple slope,
bradical, short=−0.08, p=0.41) and that when the development time is long, price has a
negative effect on the sales of radical new products (simple slope, bradical, long=−1.72,
p<0.05). Figure 1a graphically represents the two slopes for the group of radical
new products. The results further show that price has no significant effect on sales
for incremental new products with short development times (simple slope,
bincremental, short=−0.13, p=0.16). Price has however a negative effect on sales for
incremental new products with long development times (simple slope, bincremental, long=
−0.20, p<0.05). Figure 1b graphically shows the slopes for the incremental new
products. These findings provide partial support for H2 because price was expected to
have a negative effect on sales for incremental new products regardless of the
development time elapsed.
The results of model 3 additionally show that the interaction between
development time and product innovativeness is positively related to new product
sales (b15=0.85, p<0.01). This finding is consistent with prior studies investigating
the contingency effect of product innovativeness (Ali 2000; Langerak and Hultink
2006). The results also reveal that lead user involvement (b10=0.53, p<0.01) and
market pull (b11=0.40, p<0.05) exert positive effects on new product sales. These
findings are consistent with prior research showing that customer input in NPD
improves the probability of new product success (Henard and Szymanski 2001). The
results further show that, in line with what could be expected, most quarter dummies
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have a negative effect on new product sales, indicating that the cumulative sales of
products introduced in the second quarter or later is generally lower than the sales of
the products launched in the first quarter of our data.
4.2 Endogeneity concerns and alternative model specifications
The specified models included several variables to reduce specification errors.
However, there is a chance that development time may be correlated with variables
Table 3 Estimation results of the effects of development time, product innovativeness, and new product
price on cumulative sales volume
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Control variables
Constant (b0) 0.21 0.16 −0.22
Dummy 2nd quarter (b1) −0.89* −1.17** −0.93**
Dummy 3rd quarter (b2) −0.61** −0.71** −0.36
Dummy 4th quarter (b3) −0.73** −0.87** −0.41
Dummy 5th quarter (b4) −0.03 0.00 0.30
Dummy 6th quarter (b5) −0.93** −0.79* −0.38
Dummy 7th quarter (b6) −0.91** −0.98** −0.80**
Dummy 8th quarter (b7) −0.39 −0.39 0.28
Dummy 9th quarter (b8) −0.97** −1.04** −0.65*
Dummy 10th quarter (b9) −1.17** −1.03** −0.86*
Lead user involvement (b10) 0.50** 0.48** 0.53**
Market pull (b11) 0.18* 0.19 0.40**
Independent variables
Development time (b12) 0.11 −0.08
Product innovativeness (b13) 0.21 0.38**
New product price (b14) −0.28*** −0.17*
Interaction effects
Development time × product innovativeness (b15) 0.85***
Development time × new product price (b16) −0.04
Product innovativeness × new product price (b17) −0.73***
Development time × product innovativeness
× new product price
(b18) −0.78***
N 129 129 129
df of regression model 11, 117 14, 114 18, 110
R2 0.19 0.27 0.44
Adjusted R2 0.12 0.18 0.35
F-statistic 2.544*** 3.022*** 4.838***
R2 change 0.08 0.17
F change statistic 4.045*** 8.438***
df of F change statistic 3, 114 4, 110
*p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
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that were omitted from the specified model or that development time may vary for
radical and incremental new products. Usually, it is assumed that radical new
products take longer to develop than incremental new products (e.g., Ali 2000;
Griffin 2002), although the firm central in our study takes on average shorter to
develop radical new products. According to one of the higher managers, employees
might devote more time and resources to the development of radical new products
than to the development of incremental new products as these radical projects are
more challenging.
Unfortunately, data limitations (i.e., the absence of additional instrumental
variables in the firm’s database) prevented us from conducting a test on the
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Fig. 1 a Simple slopes for radical new products. b Simple slopes for incremental new products
Market Lett (2009) 20:399–413 409
exogeneity of development time using model 3. Alternatively, we conducted a
Hausman test using a reduced model to investigate the extent to which the firm-
specific relationship between product innovativeness and development time may
have affected our results. To this end, we first specified a model in which we
regressed development time on the quarter dummies, product innovativeness, and
the lead user involvement and market pull dummies. Next, we regressed cumulative
sales on development time, product innovativeness, new product price, and the
residuals from the first model. The results show that there was a nonsignificant
negative effect of the residuals on cumulative sales (bresiduals=−0.30, p=0.18), which
rejects the hypothesis that development time is endogenous.
We also estimated a model in which we replaced the quarter dummies with a
single variable representing the number of weeks that the new product had been
on the market. The results show that the coefficients of interest are not
substantially different from the ones reported in model 3. The fit of the
alternative model (R2=0.31, Adj. R2=0.26, F value (10,118)=5.427) is, however,
significantly (p<0.01) worse than that of model 3. Finally, we also estimated a
model in which we used the average weekly sales as a dependent variable to control
for the varying duration effects of new products. The results of the simple slope tests are
similar to the ones reported above, but the model fit is worse (R2=0.17, Adj. R2=0.10,
F value (9,119)=2.628).
5 Discussion and implications
This study is part of a continuing effort by Ali (2000) and others to shed light on the
relationship between development time and new product performance. The present
study broadens the theory on development time-based competition by incorporating
new product price in the relationship between development time, product
innovativeness, and new product sales. It also provides evidence that firms need to
coordinate the pricing decision with other launch decisions, in particular the new
product’s innovativeness and development time decisions.
Although the results of this study are not strictly normative, our empirical
findings provide three specific managerial insights. First, the results show that price
has no effect on sales for radical new products with short development times. This
finding makes clear that the disadvantages associated with cycle time reduction
cannot be resolved by charging a penetration price that rewards customers for
compromised product advantage (Calantone and Di Benedetto 2007). These radical
new products simply do not meet customer requirements, which is a dominant driver
of new product success, due to the hidden costs of accelerated NPD. Second, the
finding that price has a negative effect on the sales of radical new products with long
development times conforms to our expectations. Charging a high price is clearly too
costly to firms taking more time to develop radical new products as the new
product’s break-even time is extended (Ali et al. 1995), and demand is unnecessarily
restricted to those customers willing and able to pay a high price (Guiltinan 1999).
Third, the results show that price has no effect on sales for incremental new products
with short development times. This unexpected finding sheds new light on
conventional wisdom that favors setting a low price for incremental new products
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that are sped to the market. An explanation may be that for incremental new
products, the pricing decision is subservient to the development time decision and
that getting incremental new products to market as quickly as possible is what truly
counts to ensure sufficient sales. Obviously, more in-depth research is required on
this issue. The result that new product price negatively affects sales for incremental
new products with long development times conforms to conventional wisdom. This
finding demonstrates that a low price is perhaps the only feasible option to lift sales
for new products with a minor advantage over existing products that have taken (too)
long to develop.
6 Limitations and further research
This study has several limitations. First, we must acknowledge the possibility of
endogeneity in development time affecting our estimation results because the firm
being studied systematically emphasized radical products relative to incremental
products for faster development. Second, we only considered new products from one
firm which warrants caution regarding the generalizability of the findings. However,
it allowed us to use objective data on development time, new product price, and unit
sales not available from larger intra- and inter-industry studies. Third, we must
recognize the drawback of using classification data for lead user involvement, push
or pull and product innovativeness, despite the external validation of the
innovativeness classification for 66 products. Fourth, we only had the new product’s
cumulative unit sales at our disposal. Weekly sales data would have enabled us to
estimate new product sales curves, which would yield more precise insights into if
and how the interaction between development time, innovativeness, and price
changes over time. Fifth, we used a price measure that reflects an average selling
price. To the extent that new products are sold to key accounts at a discount and
price changes over time, especially relative to competitors’ prices, some bias may
inhere in our findings. Sixth, the absence of an effect of new product price on sales
for radical new products with short development times may be attributed to order
of entry effects. Data limitations prevented us from controlling for this effect.
Finally, we restricted our attention to new products with continued market
acceptance. None of the new products were withdrawn from the market in the
observed study period. Different results could surface if the time period under
consideration was extended.
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